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Origins of the Moral Regeneration Movement
The origins of the Moral Regeneration Movement
(MRM) date back to a meeting between then-
president Nelson Mandela and key South African
religious leaders in June 1997. At that meeting,
Mandela spoke about the role of religion in
nation-building and social transformation, and
the need for religious institutions to work with the
state. He also described the ‘spiritual malaise’
underpinning the crime problem:
Our hopes and dreams, at times, seem to
be overcome by cynicism, self-
centredness and fear. This spiritual malaise
sows itself as a lack of good spirit, as
pessimism, or lack of hope and faith. And
from it emerge the problems of greed and
cruelty, of laziness and egotism, of
personal and family failure. It both helps
fuel the problems of crime and corruption
and hinders our efforts to deal with 
them.2
The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy(NCPS) was the first policy initiative toexplicitly link the issues of crime and
morality. In its strategy to tackle crime, the NCPS
consisted of four ‘pillars’ – each one “a particular
arena of attack against the factors which create or
facilitate criminal activity”. One of these pillars
focused on public values and education, with the
intention of tackling “the prevailing moral climate
within communities, the attitudes towards crime,
and tolerance of crime”.
The aims of the NCPS in respect of public values
and education included “the development of strong
community values and social pressure against
criminality and activities which support
criminality”.1 Although none of the NCPS
programmes materialised in their envisaged form,
many of its key messages were contained in
subsequent publicity campaigns by the various
national criminal justice departments, and by
provincial governments. 
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Politicians, religious leaders and social commentators have all spoken about a breakdown in morality in South
Africa, with crime as the most commonly cited evidence. The moral regeneration initiative is one response to
this crisis, emerging in parallel to countless other initiatives aimed at reducing crime, some of which have
themselves contained explicit appeals to morals, values or ethics. A review of its origins and development
shows that the moral regeneration initiative has suffered from a lack of clarity about both its mission and its
strategy. The movement’s attempts to build meaningful civil society participation in the campaign have also
been a key challenge.
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Mandela then called on the religious leaders to get
actively involved in a campaign, which would
subsequently become the moral regeneration
initiative. At a moral summit in October 1998, he
listed the kinds of crime problems the moral
regeneration campaign should tackle:
The symptoms of our spiritual malaise are
only too familiar. They include the extent of
corruption both in the public and private
sector, where office and positions of
responsibility are treated as opportunities for
self-enrichment; the corruption that occurs
within our justice system; violence in
interpersonal relations and families, in
particular the shameful record of abuse of
women and children; and the extent of tax
evasion and refusal to pay for services used.3
One of the key sources of the moral regeneration
initiative within the ANC was its commission for
religious affairs; it was also linked to the concept of
African Renaissance, which was strongly promoted
by, and associated with Mandela’s successor, Thabo
Mbeki. After the 1999 election, with Mbeki as
president and Jacob Zuma as deputy president, the
moral regeneration initiative began to enjoy more
formal attention from the presidency. 
In dividing up political and administrative tasks
between the president and deputy president in the
early days of their term, Zuma was allocated
responsibility for this initiative. Staff in the
presidency describe this as a routine division of
labour, with no great political significance.
However, the subsequent allegations of corruption
levelled against deputy president Zuma’s financial
advisor led to various questions and criticisms
about his role in the moral regeneration initiative;
often insinuating some political significance to his
association with the campaign. 
In fact, Zuma’s role is that of political patron and
‘front man’, and only occasionally has he
participated in behind-the-scenes work. The deputy
president’s office has some responsibility for
political co-ordination of the moral regeneration
work being done in government, but this too is a
fairly arms-length relationship; especially since the
establishment of the Moral Regeneration Movement
(MRM) with its own offices in Johannesburg.
‘Campaign’ approach to mobilise support
After a two-year hiatus in the moral regeneration
initiative, the Mbeki government attempted to add
impetus by convening two workshops with a broad
range of political and religious leaders in 2000. The
workshop reports contain no references to the
NCPS or other anti-crime initiatives then under way
which may have been relevant. Instead, the
political ‘campaign’ approach to moral regeneration
emerged strongly:
The best way of taking the message to the rest
of the nation was through a national
campaign. In the past, campaigns have
worked well because they sensitised the
nation to critical issues facing it … It was
agreed that the campaign for moral
regeneration will consist of the following: 
• setting up of a co-ordinating committee; 
• negotiating with print and electronic
media for regular input;
• starting dialogue with identified possible 
partners;
• promoting the campaign through a simple 
leaflet;
• organising a workshop for all government   
departments;
• organising a joint conference with 
religious communities;
• training of community facilitators.
This approach was similar to many other initiatives
of its time, taking the methodology of the anti-
apartheid struggle into a government-led initiative,
with an emphasis on structures and process rather
than on the content of the messages. What was
envisaged was a mass mobilisation, harking back to
the glory days of the liberation movement, to a time
when a large majority of people and organisations
could be united against a common enemy – in this
case, moral malaise and criminality.
The moral regeneration ‘campaign’ had been
conceptualised as an ever-expanding partnership
between government and organised civil society,
(especially faith-based organisations) who would
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regeneration issues, including administering the
grants to the MRM, and co-ordinating government-
wide activity that could be seen as relevant to the
initiative. The deputy president’s office is described
as the movement’s political hub inside government,
with DAC as the administrative hub. Apart from
Zuma’s ongoing public speaking about moral
regeneration, little momentum was sustained
around the initiative inside government
departments in the period immediately after the
MRM was launched. This stagnation may have
been the result of a perception that the MRM –
configured now as an NGO outside of government
– would be taking responsibility for the campaign. 
An issue which began to dog the moral
regeneration initiative was the increasing public
discussion (both in the media and in parliament)
concerning allegations of corruption levelled at
deputy president Zuma, associated with the
prosecution of Shabir Shaik, his financial advisor.
The corruption allegations were often raised as a
contrast or challenge to Zuma’s patronage of the
moral regeneration campaign. As the trial of Shaik
is currently under way, it remains to be seen
whether any of the allegations will be sustained,
and whether perceptions of corruption will adhere
to Zuma or, by association, to the MRM.
The MRM’s new vision 
By mid-2004, the staff of the MRM, together with
its trustees and a couple of its founding members,
were engaged in a re-visioning exercise for the
campaign. There was some acknowledgment that
the MRM had not achieved enough in the first years
of its existence. A great deal of energy had gone
into grassroots mobilisation and facilitation – many
awareness-raising workshops all over the country –
but this type of work was hard to quantify and its
impact even more difficult to demonstrate. Little
had been achieved in the critical arena of public
communication. 
Problems were also identified related to leadership
and co-ordination of the movement. The
composition of the MRM’s governing structures was
revisited, and an ‘expert-based Board’ was created
in place of the previous structures which had
attempted to represent the range of sectors
engage in campaigning and other activities to
rebuild the social fabric of society and improve the
moral fibre of the nation. (It was, however, never
clear exactly what these activities should be, nor
how they would rebuild morality).
Within the vision of a ‘movement’, there was a
need for some sort of secretariat or organisational
base for the moral regeneration initiative. It had
been decided that this should no longer rest within
government, but in civil society. (The architects of
the moral regeneration campaign appear to have
failed to recognise some of the profound changes
that had affected civil society in post-apartheid
South Africa.)
Child rape ‘scourge’ revives interest
In late 2001, a moral panic in the media about
levels of child rape and sexual violence in South
Africa revived interest in moral regeneration issues,
and it was decided to launch a Moral Regeneration
Movement in early 2002. This was done through
the establishment of a Section 21 (not-for-profit)
company which, although intended to be a non-
governmental organisation, was funded by
government. 
The high profile launch of the Moral Regeneration
Movement took place in April 2002, with over
1,000 people present from government, parliament,
provincial legislatures, political parties, religious
organisations, traditional structures, and NGOs. The
speakers at the launch did not provide any
guidance on exactly how ‘the people’ could get
actively involved in moral regeneration, and this
lack of clarity continued to be a key problem with
the campaign. 
Approximately a year was spent on setting up the
organisation and generating a vision for its role; an
extremely slow (and costly) process. The newly-
formed MRM attempted to make clear its core
messages, and focussed on the Constitution as a
source of moral values – a shift from the earlier
discourse of spirituality and religion, with less
reference to crime. 
In government, the department of arts and culture
(DAC) was tasked with administration of moral
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participating in the campaign. An annual conference
for the participants and affiliates of the MRM was
proposed. 
The new board of the MRM, in its presentation at the
2004 annual conference, recommended that the
MRM office become more focused on advocacy
work, and identified five areas for the organisation’s
future activities:
• building the MRM;
• leading public discourse on moral regeneration 
issues;
• developing a national consensus on positive 
values that should be embraced;
• promoting ethical behaviour congruent with 
these positive values;
• disseminating information on moral issues.4
This appears to be a new approach to the vexed
question of civil society participation in the moral
regeneration campaign. It is underpinned by an
implicit acknowledgement that there is a need to
advocate around moral regeneration, rather than
assuming (as had been the case in earlier incarnations
of the campaign) that there was organic public
support for these issues.
Challenges facing the moral regeneration campaign
A key challenge is that of sustainability – whether the
campaign can be sustained as  a ‘civil society
initiative’ in the absence of a popular, organic support
base. The other related challenge is that of financial
sustainability. The government grant to fund the
establishment of the MRM was for an initial period of
three years, to the end of March 2005. It is not, at this
stage, clear whether further funds will be forthcoming. 
The nature of the MRM’s activities will also be a key
determinant of its future sustainability. Simply acting
as co-ordinator of efforts taking place elsewhere has
been seen to be unsuccessful, not least because an
external co-ordinating agency cannot instruct other
organisations to act. (The attempts by the department
of safety and security to ‘co-ordinate’ government-
wide crime prevention efforts since 1996 are
evidence of this problem.)
The movement also faces the problem of defining and
identifying activities as morally regenerative. While
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there is a potentially large ‘feelgood factor’
associated with moral regeneration – all manner of
activities could be seen as part of the campaign – it
will be extremely difficult to empirically
demonstrate whether any of these activities actually
enhance morality.
The moral regeneration campaign failed to ally itself
with the government’s 1996 National Crime
Prevention Strategy (although this may have been
wise, given that the NCPS subsequently fell into
disfavour).5 It has, however, engaged occasionally
with other government anti-crime campaigns,
notably against gender violence and child abuse. 
The government sector’s participation in the moral
regeneration initiative appears to be regaining some
momentum. It will be interesting to see how this is
sustained in parallel to the MRM itself becoming a
more focused advocacy and communication NGO.
Already the relationship between the MRM office –
itself an offspring of government – and some
national government departments has been a little
difficult. This relationship will surely be central in
defining the campaign in the next period.
In terms of relationships outside of the government
sector, the MRM has failed to engage meaningfully
with the full range of NGOs doing crime prevention
work relevant to its efforts, resulting in significant
lost opportunities. This may be a result of the
organisation’s limited capacity and consequent
failure to build effective networks.6 It could also be
related to the campaign’s own uncertainty and
ambiguity about the role of NGOs and civil society. 
The more mainstream crime prevention NGOs – for
instance NICRO, RAPCAN and the Crime
Prevention Alliance – may also be wary of engaging
with the moral regeneration initiative because of
perceptions that it is either a religious or spiritual
initiative (or both), or closely allied to government.
Although no longer very religious in phrasing, the
moral regeneration initiative is still associated with
a religious initiative. Perhaps for that reason, it is
still viewed with some unease by those who are
uncomfortable with the language and practice of
organised religion. Conversely, the moral
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 11 MARCH 2005 13
regeneration initiative may also have been borne
out of a recognition that there is indeed an area of
individual and social life beyond the material,
which impacts on quality of life and the
achievement of the government’s election promise
to deliver ‘a better life for all’. As one of the South
African experts on ethics put it:
In the heat of the resistance struggle I think a
lot of us lost sight of the whole other side; of
people’s need for religion or spirituality.7
Conclusion
The development of the moral regeneration
initiative in South Africa has seen the concept
defined in terms of both crime prevention and
nation-building. In some incarnations, moral
regeneration has had a distinctly spiritual and
religious tone; in others, a strong flavour of African
nationalist ideology. 
Remarkably, and probably only because of the
tolerance for diversity that is South African, it has
survived its own confusion and embraced a range
of differing interest groups – conservative religious
groups, some elements of the business community,
political parties, government and intellectuals. What
remains to be seen is whether a largely ideological
campaign of this type will deliver any meaningful
results in terms of strengthening social fabric and
reducing crime. 
This article is based on a forthcoming ISS monograph.
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